Life insurance contracts are often complex financial securities pervaded by embedded options such as interest rate guarantees, bonus and surrender options, and sometimes even more exotic elements. It is safe to say that historically these financial elements have typically not been offered specific attention by accountants and actuaries of the issuing companies who, until very recently, have relied on traditional actuarial methods 1 and old-fashioned accounting principles for valuation, and for reporting and managing the risk of their liabilities. The inadequacy of these procedures was mercilessly exposed during a period starting in the late 1980s and lasting through most of the 1990s, when insurance markets experienced considerable turmoil and many companies defaulted on their obligations. For more discussion and some examples the reader is referred to Briys and de Varenne [1997] and Grosen and Jørgensen [2001] .
Many of these defaults were triggered by the decline in the general level of interest rates which occurred in this period and which led to a sharp increase in the value of liabilitiesin particular those containing generous rate of return guarantees-and hence to insolvency. A natural consequence of these unfortunate events has been a sharply increased focus from many sides on more effective enterprise-wide risk management techniques in the insurance business. The recent academic works by Consiglio, Cocco, and Zenios [2000, 2001] contain many interesting insights in this respect.
In addition to documenting typical characteristics of life insurance products in, e.g., Germany, the U.K., and Italy, these papers propose models that carefully integrate the asset management problem with the problems of having to honor obligations partly in the form of issued options on the liability side.
Before insurance companies were required to report fair or market values of assets and liabilities in the balance sheets, problems with solvency for the above-mentioned or similar reasons could be partly remedied by, e.g., appropriate application of book values or amortized cost at relevant entries in the balance sheet. But if what is hoped to be a temporary problem turns out to be more permanent (in this case low bond yields and high promised returns), then creative accounting will merely save companies from immediate "meltdowns" and leave them instead as victims to slow "suffocation" which must finally terminate when promised returns can no longer be honored. In this sense the "truth" will eventually come out, but if significantly delayed it will almost inevitably be at the cost of unfair redistributions of wealth between the different classes of stakeholders of the company.
The above insight, along with pressure from regulatory authorities, and the desire to possess better tools for risk management have been major motivating factors for the initiatives which have been taken recently by the insurance business as well as by the account-
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is associate professor of finance at the University of Aarhus in Denmark. He may be contacted at ecolochte@econ.au.dk ing profession with respect to developing more modern valuation techniques and more appropriate and informative accounting standards. Specifically there has been a sharply increased focus on the market valuation of life insurance liabilities since 1994 when the American Academy of Actuaries appointed a Fair Valuation of Liabilities Task Force to consider the problems associated with the measurement of fair value: see, e.g., Babbel and Merrill [1998, 1999] . The task force report is contained in Vanderhoof and Altman [1998] along with several other significant contributions to the understanding of the fair value of insurance liabilities. With regard to the accounting issue, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) is one organization which has addressed the problem of market value accounting by issuing a series of statements of standards concerning derivative financial instruments in general (e.g., FAS 107, 115, 119, 133, and 137) and life insurance liabilities in particular (FAS 120).
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Another organization is the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) which has launched a project to develop international Generally Accepted Accounting Principles for insurers which can be accepted by stock markets, regulators, and the insurance industry. The reader is referred to Forfar and Masters [1999] for a more detailed discussion of the present work towards developing international accounting standards for the life insurance business. The IASC Steering Committee is expected to publish the International Accounting Standard in the fall of 2002.
The present article has been motivated by the issues discussed above and follows the line of thought underlying the fair valuation principles. Clearly the idea of fair valuation goes to the heart of enterprise-wide risk management. More specifically, we set up a stylized, dynamic model for a life insurance company in which the issues of embedded option and interest rate guarantee valuation, insolvency risk management, and market valuation of the balance sheet elements as well as some additional issues can be analyzed. The liability and equity contracts will be priced and analyzed as financial economists deal with contingent claims; i.e., we will make use of the rich toolbox of contingent claims analysis, e.g., no-arbitrage and martingale pricing techniques. We are obviously not the first to take this approach but nevertheless omit a large literature review here. The reader is instead referred to Grosen and Jørgensen [2001] . A reference to the model by Briys and de Varenne [1997] is inevitable, however, since this model is the foundation for the analysis presented in the present article. We extend the Briys-de Varenne model with a number of features which, among other things, imply a more realistic description of the mechanism of default and which assign a more meaningful and dynamic role to the guaranteed rate of return.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In the first section we present the basic framework and provide a detailed description of the insurance claims under scrutiny. The succeeding section presents the dynamics of the state-variables which are necessary for obtaining dynamic valuation of the contracts. A numerical section is then provided which contains detailed numerical analyses and a variety of examples which illustrate the implications and potential usefulness of the model. The final section presents our conclusions.
THE BASIC FRAMEWORK
In order to analyze the problems discussed in the introduction we must set up a formal model. We introduce and explain the basics of our proposed model in this and the next section. The model builds on and extends ideas from Briys and de Varenne [1997] and Grosen and Jørgensen [2001] .
The agents of our model economy consist of the (groups of) policyholders and equityholders of an insurance company formed by the infusion of capital from these agents at time zero. It is useful to think of policyholders as having acquired a policy from the company in return for the time zero investment (premium) which we denote L 0 . This policy is a liability to the company. It is a claim on future contingent payouts to be described in full detail below.
Equityholders add equity capital, E 0 , to the premium proceeds to set up the total initial asset base, A 0 , backing the insurance claim. Equityholders thereby also acquire a contingent claim, i.e., a residual claim for the leftovers when all insurance obligations have been settled.
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The time zero balance sheet is presented in Exhibit 1. Note that we have introduced a constant, α, which captures the initial fraction of capital provided by policyholders. Accordingly, we shall refer to α as the initial wealth distribution coefficient.
As is implicit from the above, we view the insurance company as a portfolio of contingent claims and in the remainder of the article we shall value and analyze these claims precisely as financial economists routinely deal with financial contingent claims. In order to do this it is necessary first to describe the claims in detail and second to describe the dynamics and uncertainty structure of the economy in which these claims are to be analyzed and priced.
Let us first focus on the details of the policyholders' contract. The objective is to describe a contingent claim with characteristics which resemble the characteristics of the life insurance contracts that are found in practice.
3 First and foremost is the guaranteed interest rate or guaranteed rate of return which is built into the investment part of most life insurance contracts. This guarantee feature is typically very explicit in promising the policyholders that their initially deposited capital (L 0 ) will accumulate by at least some fixed annual rate, r G , over the length of the contract. Since we assume that the policy matures at time T, the guaranteed rate of return translates into a guar T , and in the event that the company has not defaulted prior to time T, the policyholders will simply seize the total assets and leave the equityholders empty-handed.
As is implicit in the above, we will introduce a default mechanism which may force closure of the company prior to the maturity date. This mechanism is motivated by the fact that supervisory and regulatory authorities monitor insurance companies regularly for solvency basically by comparing the status of the assets relative to insurance obligations.
In the present article we assume continuous monitoring through time. More specifically, the regulatory authorities will compute at any time t
The technical solvency requirement would be A t > L G t , ∀t, but to allow for a little extra flexibility we will instead use a default triggering solvency boundary, B(t), defined as follows: where λ can be interpreted as a boundary level parameter. The curve B(t) is thus a time-dependent minimum required level of capital and we shall refer to it simply as the regulatory boundary. We clearly must require that A 0 > B 0 , but if at some later point in time , ∈]0, T], the regulatory authorities learn that A() = B(), then the company will be shut down immediately and liquidated, and any recovered funds will be distributed to stakeholders. In this respect note that 0 < λ < 1 corresponds to a situation where continued operation with limited deficits (technical insolvency) is allowed. If default is anyhow triggered, policyholders will receive all recovered funds and equityholders will receive nothing. The case of > 1 corresponds to strict regulation in the sense that continued operation is conditional on the maintenance of a buffer of a certain size between the asset value and the nominal liability. If closure is triggered, policyholders receive the full promised amount (although prematurely) of L 0 e r G T , and equityholders or third parties (lawyers) seize the buffer. The situation with < 1 is illustrated in Exhibit 2 with two simulated scenarios for the evolution of the total asset value (more on asset dynamics later). The situation with > 1 would place the regulatory boundary above the L G t -curve. In this respect note that meaningful values of must lie in the interval [0, 1/α[, since default is triggered immediately if ≥ 1/α. Now, not all scenarios are bad-there is also an upside to consider where profits can be shared. In fact, in the insurance business profits must be shared as dictated by the so-called contribution principle (see, e.g., Black and Skipper [1994] ). In practice this is done by distributing bonus on top of the guaranteed return when asset returns evolve favorably. The mechanism according to which bonus is distributed is an extremely complex one involving intangible political, legal, and strategic considerations within the insurance company. However, in order to apply financial valuation techniques to these insurance claims we must have the bonus mechanism described as a well-defined mathematical function of the state-variables of the model. This can only be obtained by making some simplifications, and this trade-off between realism and tractability should be kept in mind in the following where we present our description of the bonus distribution mechanism, and later when numerical results are presented and evaluated.
Adopting the approach in Briys and de Varenne [1997] , we specify the bonus payout function as follows:
The rationale for the specification in (2) is the following. αA T is the maturity value of the assets contributed by policyholders. The bonus mechanism is an option on this asset with the promised maturity payment L G T serving as the exercise price. Policyholders will receive only a fraction, ␦, of any surplus with the remaining fraction of (1 -␦) serving in some sense as a premium for the partial downside protection. Policies that participate partially in the upside potential in this or a similar way constitute the bulk of life insurance contracts in practice. 5 We shall thus refer to the parameter ␦ as the participation coefficient. The total maturity payoff to the policyholders' contract can now be written as
The first term of (3) is the bonus option described above. The second term is the constant promised maturity payment implied by the guaranteed rate of return, and the final term represents the company's (put) option to default at maturity. In sum, the last two terms are thus equivalent to a credit risky bond payoff. We stress that the payoff in (3) is conditional on the company's survival through time T. Recall from earlier that if the regulatory boundary is hit at some time before time T, then there will be a contract payment of (, 1) L 0 e r G T at that time, after which the company will be closed.
As mentioned earlier, the equityholders' claim is a residual claim for what is left when policy obligations have been met. We thus establish the conditional maturity payment to equityholders as the difference between the time T total asset value and the payoff in (3):
Equityholders' maturity claim thus consists of a long call option on total assets struck at the promised maturity payment and a shorted call which is the bonus option issued to policyholders. The state-dependent payoff structures of the stakeholders' claims are now fully described, but in order to progress towards the proper valuation of these claims we must specify the dynamics of the economy. We turn to this issue in the next section.
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The dynamics of our model economy are described by setting up a pair of stochastic differential equations which determine the evolution through time of the statevariables, i.e., the short-term riskless interest rate and the asset value, respectively. We let
where W 1 t and dW 2 t are standard Brownian motions with coefficient of correlation ρ.
Several comments on (5) and (6) are in order at this point. First, we note that for convenience (and to save space) the system (5)- (6) is specified directly under the riskneutral probability measure.
6 Second, the interest rate process in (5) is the well-known mean-reverting Vasicek process (see Vasicek [1977] ) with being the mean-reversion level, κ the speed of mean reversion, and σ r the constant interest rate volatility. Despite some minor drawbacks the Vasicek model is in widespread use because of its simplicity and analytical tractability. 7 Finally, note that the riskless interest rate enters as the drift coefficient in the asset value process (6)-a consequence of the risk-neutral specification.
The major advantage of specifying the risk-neutral processes is that when operating under the corresponding risk-neutral probability measure every asset value can be represented as the expectation of future payoffs discounted with the riskless interest rates. This cornerstone result of modern finance theory (see Harrison and Kreps [1979] ) is dictated by the natural requirement of absence of arbitrage. We will apply the result immediately to the liabilityholders' claim.
If we let ψ L (, A ) symbolize the payoff to the liabilityholders' contract at the random date which was formalized in (3) and the subsequent discussion, 8 the above-mentioned result allows us to represent the arbitrage-free time value, t value, V t L , of the liabilityholders' claim as
where E t { • }denotes expectation formed at time t with respect to the risk-neutral probability measure under which the processes (5) and (6) were defined. Similarly, for the equityholders with their payoff function denoted by ψ E (, A ), we have
but note more interestingly that the value additivity principle 9 implies that the following identity must hold at all times and in all states:
We shall return to this last relation in the next section. While it is a lengthy and tedious mathematical exercise to evaluate the above expectations analytically (the interested reader is referred to Jørgensen [2001] ), for given parameter values the expressions can be easily and very accurately computed by numerical integration, i.e., Monte Carlo simulation. The Monte Carlo method has been applied to obtain the numerical results which are presented and discussed in the following.
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MODEL RESULTS AND NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
The numerical analysis in this section is divided into two parts. First, the concept of initially fair contracts is introduced and analyzed, and thereafter we explore the valuation and risk analysis of contracts that were initiated at fair terms.
Fair Contracts
As discussed earlier, we imagine a life insurance contract or policy as a financial contingent claim with welldefined characteristics. The obvious contract parameters are the time to maturity, T, the guaranteed return, r G , the participation coefficient, ␦, and the initial wealth distribution coefficient, α, but information about the underlying asset (parameters of the system of processes (5) and (6)) and about the regulatory environment () is also essential for a complete description of the contract. Hence, the result obtained from the valuation of a contract according to (7) will be a function of the values attached to these parameters. It follows that not every choice of parameters will represent an initially fair contract in the sense that the value assigned to it by (7) equals the initial premium, L 0 . As an example of this, with < 1 suppose we let the participation coefficient increase towards one and hold val- 
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ues of the remaining parameters fixed. This implies that more and more wealth is transferred to the policyholders. This is clearly inconsistent with a fixed value of the initial wealth distribution coefficient, α.
An interesting first research subject is therefore to explore the set of parameters which defines fair contracts. However, due to the rather large number of parameters (and partially also due to the somewhat time-consuming Monte Carlo-based valuation method) we cannot hope for a complete description of this set, but must confine ourselves to study some relevant and realistic examples. Exhibit 3 is a graphical illustration of the results obtained from studying a number of such examples where we have held fixed some model parameters and varied others (in this case r G , σ A , and ␦) to establish parameter combinations which represent fair contracts in the sense discussed above. To be more specific, we have fixed the parameters of the interest rate process (5) at the following values κ = 0.25, θ = 0.07, σ r = 0.02, and r 0 = 0.04. These values are safely within the range where financial econometricians commonly estimate them (see, e.g., Chan et al. [1992] ), and they imply a realistically shaped and positively sloped term structure curve with zero coupon interest rates rising from 4% in the short end towards approximately 6.7% as time to maturity tends to infinity. In empirical studies the correlation between equity and interest rate risk is typically found to be slightly positive, so we set ρ = 0.25. Life insurance and pension contracts are mostly longlived products, so the time to maturity is fixed at 20 years in this example. We assume a 25%/75% initial split between equity and contract liabilities, i.e., α = 0.75 in our illustration. A 0 can be set to 100 without loss of generality, and then we have and E 0 = 25 and L 0 = 75. Finally, the regulatory environment is characterized by a level parameter = 0.75. As briefly discussed earlier, this implies that regulatory authorities will allow continued operation of the life insurance company in a "zone" which is characterized by slight technical insolvency, or more precisely a maximum shortfall of 25%; cf. Exhibit 2. All this leaves us with three "free" parameters: the guaranteed rate of return, r G , the asset volatility, σ A , and the participation rate, ␦. Now, Exhibit 3 was constructed by performing a numerical search for a fair participation rate for combinations of r G and σ A where r G ∈ {0.0%, 0.5%, ..., 7.5%} and σ A ∈ {10%, 11%, ..., 30%}. To recapitulate, a fair participation rate is a value in the inter- 
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Fair Contract Surface is therefore easily constructed within the Monte Carlo framework. The result of these efforts is the fair contract surface in r G , σ A , and ␦)-space shown in Exhibit 3. There are several interesting observations to be made from this graph. First, note that when the asset volatility and the guaranteed rate of return are both low, the policyholders must be compensated by a high participation rate, and vice versa. For example, σ A and r G can become so small that it is not possible to achieve V 0 L = 75 even for ␦ → 1. In other words, fair contracts do not always exist. Second, it can be seen that for all volatilities there is an inverse relationship between the guaranteed rate of return and the participation coefficient for fair contracts. This is only natural as higher values of these parameters both favor the policyholders. Third, note that for fixed r G the relation between σ A and ␦ is ambiguous. When r G is low, higher asset volatilities imply lower values of ␦, whereas the reverse is the case for high values of r G . The explanation for this phenomenon is the following. When r G is low, the maturity bonus option element dominates the contract value and ␦ and σ A both affect the contract value positively in accordance with standard option pricing theory. Consequently, these parameters must be inversely related for fair contracts in this "neighborhood." On the other hand, when r G is high, the (credit risky) bond element becomes relatively more important. The asset volatility then affects the contract value negatively by increasing the probability of a boundary hit and thereby early closure of an otherwise favorable "deal." One way to compensate for this is to increase ␦ when σ A increases. The transition between the two situations discussed above occurs around a guaranteed rate of return of approximately 6% where the contracts are virtually volatility neutral. This is an interesting and important analogy to the case of corporate convertible securities which for like reasons (a composite security with both an option and a risky bond element) can also be constructed as volatility neutral. The fact that it is thus possible to obtain risk-insensitive liabilities by appropriate design of contracts is a fact that should be duly 
Valuation and Risk Analysis
Now that the concept of fair contracts has been explained, we can devote attention to the question of which fair contracts may be interesting to explore further with due consideration to reality. For this purpose we make a brief digression to study default probabilities-or more precisely probabilities of hitting the regulatory boundaryfor a representative range of contract parameters. Exhibit 4 provides Monte Carlo estimates of these probabilities for varying values of the coefficient of correlation between equity and interest rate risk, the time to maturity, the guaranteed rate of return, the asset volatility, and for two different initial term structure curves. However, before we discuss the estimated probabilities some comments are in order.
First, the three different values of the guaranteed rate of return, r G , have been chosen to reflect the three most recent maximum technical interest rates in Denmark. The maximum technical interest rate, which is announced by the Financial Supervisory Authority and again regulated by EU directives, 11 is the maximum guaranteed rate of return insurers are allowed to offer to new policyholders. This technical interest rate was 4.5% until July 1, 1994. Following a sharp decline in the general level of interest rates in the early 1990s, it was then lowered to 2.5% and further lowered to 1.5% as from January 1, 1999. For a sample of maximum technical interest rates in other countries the reader is referred to Grosen and Jørgensen [2001] . Second, we restrict our attention to asset volatilities between 5% and 20% since assets of pension fund and life insurance companies are typically well-diversified portfolios and tend to include a large weight of fixed income securities with moderate volatility. Third, the table is divided vertically into two parts. In the left part of the table the location of the term structure curve is as in the previous section (θ = 0.07, r 0 = 0.04) and is intended to approximately reflect the current situation in the EU, whereas in the right part of the table the curve lies 1%-2%-points lower (θ = 0.05, r 0 = 0.03, implying a long-term interest rate of approximately 4.7%). This allows us to study the effects on default probabilities of an imagined sudden decrease in the level of interest rates, i.e., a downward displacement of the term structure curve. The remaining parameters have been set as in the previous subsection. Finally, one caveat: The Monte Carlo-estimated probabilities are risk-neutral probabilities which are equal to the actual probabilities only to the extent that interest rate and equity risk are not compensated or priced by the market or to the extent that the investors are in fact risk neutral. They should otherwise be interpreted with great care. With this important caveat in mind, let us nevertheless briefly attempt to interpret the results in Exhibit 4. We note that most effects of parameter changes are completely as expected. Default probabilities rise when asset volatility, time to maturity, and guaranteed rate of return increase, and when the general interest rate level decreases. A doubling of the coefficient of correlation between equity and interest rate risk merely has a moderate effect. Note also that since the participation coefficient only enters the maturity payoff function it does not affect default probabilities, and it is thus not necessary to specify a value of this parameter for purposes of calculating a table like Exhibit 4. In the table we have circled a small family of contracts which we believe could represent realistic approximations of real-life contracts. For these contracts the risk-neutral default probabilities are small to moderate, but it is interesting to note the sensitivity of these probabilities particularly with respect to increases in the asset volatility, the guaranteed interest rate, and to decreases in the general interest rate level. A sharp increase in the default probability may result from only small changes in these parameters.
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Exhibit 5 illustrates the value of regulatory intervention. We have taken six different fair contracts as the point of departure. The six contracts differ by their asset volatility (10% or 20%) and by their guaranteed rate of return (1.5%, 2.5%, or 4.5%). A fair participation rate has then first been determined in each case given the value of the remaining parameters including the boundary level parameter, , which was initially set to equal 0.75. The fair participation rates are shown in the legend. The Exhibit then illustrates how the values of the six contracts are affected following changes in the regulatory parameter immediately following the initiation date. Naturally, by this approach we intend to illustrate a situation in which regulatory authorities change their intervention policy after fair contracts have been negotiated by the agents. Note first that all curves pass through the point (, V L ) = (0.75, 75) . This is because α = 0.75 and contracts were negotiated at fair terms with = 0.75. Next we note that contract values fall when decreases from the starting point. However, the decrease in contract value is only marginal when volatility is low (10%). In other words, regulatory intervention is much more valuable to policyholders when the asset volatility is high, and also more important the larger the promises to policyholders in terms of the guaranteed rate of return. But note that stricter regulation is "better" only up to a certain value of , after which the value curve starts to decrease in . This happens when > 1 in a region where the bond part of the contract is "safe" so a forced closure of the company will merely expropriate the policyholders' in-the-money bonus option.
Exhibit 6 provides another perspective on the contract value sensitivity with respect to various parameters. Again we take a certain fair contract as the point of departure (circled) and then change the coefficient of correlation, ρ, the asset volatility, σ A , and the location of the term structure curve to study the effect on the Monte Carlo-estimated contract values. We also report standard errors of the Monte Carlo estimates in parentheses below the value estimates.
We draw three main conclusions from the numbers in Exhibit 6: First, contract values do not seem to be highly sensitive with respect to the coefficient of correlation between equity and interest rate risk. Second, in these examples contract values increase with asset volatility, but not nearly to the same extent as would be the case for standard options. 
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The starting point of the example in Exhibit 7 is a fair 20-year contract with 4.5% guaranteed rate of return negotiated at time zero on the basis of an asset volatility of 20%, a participation rate of 0.7421, and remaining parameters as in Exhibit 5. The distribution of wealth between policyholders and equityholders at time zero is 75%/25% and the balance sheet entries sum to 100. Then we let time pass and consider the balance sheet 10 years later for three different values of total assets at that time. For simplicity we assume an unchanged value of the short-term interest rate and hence the term structure of interest rates is the same as at time zero.
In the first of the three time 10 balance sheets, total asset value has dropped precisely to the minimum required level of capital (0.75 • 75e 0.045•10 = 88.22). The company is in default and policyholders claim 100% of the assets. In the middle and lower balance sheets, investment returns have been better with A 10 equal to 200 and 300, respectively. As expected, the fair value of both the equityand the policyholders' claim increases with the total asset value, but observe also that the equityholders, ownership fraction based on fair valuation increases in A.
CONCLUSIONS
This article develops a model in which life insurance liabilities and equity are treated as composite contingent claims with various embedded option features. The equityholders' contract is modeled as a residual claim on total assets, reflecting the limited liability of this group of claimants. The liabilityholders' contract is carefully modeled to reflect some key properties of real-life participating contracts: the guaranteed interest rate which must at least be credited each period, the right to receive a fair share of any investment surplus (i.e., participation as dictated by the contribution principle), as well as first claim on company assets in the event of default.
Moreover, we have assumed the existence of a regulatory authority which monitors the mutually formed company continuously and which has the power to shut down the company if a certain solvency requirement is not met. In this case, recovered assets are distributed prematurely to the stakeholders. The regulatory mechanism introduces a true dynamic element to the model, but it also complicates matters considerably by inducing barrier features into the contracts' embedded option elements.
The model presented in this article is useful from at least two perspectives. First, it can be implemented to determine the set of parameters that characterizes initially fair contracts in the sense that the model's valuation of the contingent contract corresponds to the initial premium. Second, the model can be used for fair market valuation of the equity and liability entries of the company's balance sheet after the inception of the contracts following changes in market conditions (state-variables). This form of application is in line with recent initiatives by the accounting profession (FASB, IASC) which seem to continue the process of strengthening its recommendations in favor of market value accounting. 3 In this article we focus exclusively on financial risk and therefore ignore traditional insurance risks. Jensen, Jørgensen, and Grosen [2001] explain how a model of the sort presented in this paper can easily be extended to allow for mortality risk under the reasonable assumption that financial risk and mortality risk are uncorrelated. 4 We apply the shorthand notation [x] + for max(x, 0) 5 See Grosen and Jørgensen [2000] for further discussion and for an alternative model which covers the case where bonus is distributed periodically. 6 The necessary steps for the transformation of a model specified under the subjective/physical probability measure to a model specified under the risk-neutral measure are explained in almost any modern finance textbook such as, e.g., Hull [2000] and Baxter and Rennie [1996] . 7 The specification in (5) implies that future interest rates are normal distributed and hence that these interest rates may assume negative values with positive probabilities. However, for realistic parameter values these probabilities are rather small, if not negligible. 8 We clearly have 
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9 The value additivity principle is also known as the law of conservation of value and is one of the "six most important ideas in finance" according to Brealey and Myers [1991] . 10 Briefly explained, we simulate independent outcomes of the stochastic variables entering equations (7) and (8). The relevant expectations are then estimated as averages of these outcomes. A standard reference on Monte Carlo methods in financial models is Boyle [1977] . Further detail on the implementation of the Monte Carlo approach in the present article are available from the author on request.
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Article 18 of the Third EU Life Insurance Directive, which was effective as of November 10, 1992, requires that interest rate guarantees do not exceed 60% of the rate of return on government debt (of unspecified maturity).
